Final 2011 Power Rankings: 116 to 113

• 120-117: New Mexico, Akron, FAU, UNLV

The Power Rankings countdown from No. 120 to 1 in the Bowl Subdivision continues. A common theme among the next crop of teams is an inability to convert opportunities — whether through yards gained, turnovers forced, or field position — into points. Memphis and Indiana were both on the positive side of the turnover differential, yet won a combined three games. MTSU moved the ball with impressive efficiency, yet scored near the bottom of FBS offenses.

Read on for the full rundown on teams Nos. 113 through 116.

Record:

2-11, 1-7 Conference USA

Offense: 21.1 PPG (No. 108), 340.3 YPG (No. 97), 126.3 rushing YPG (No. 86), 214 passing YPG (No. 71), 78 percent red zone conversion (No. 82), 37.7 third down conversion (No. 89), 23 sacks allowed (No. 54)

Defense: 37.5 PPG allowed (No. 115), 410.3 YPG allowed (No. 83), 164.9 rushing YPG allowed (No. 71), 245.4 passing YPG allowed (No. 87), 98 percent opponent red zone conversion (No. 120), 43.3 percent opponent third down conversion (No. 90), 27 sacks (No. 47)

Special Teams: 22 PR/205 yards (No. 48), 74 punts/3073 yards (No. 88), 12.9 PR yards allowed/attempt (No. 108), 11-18 FGs, 33-34 PATs, 20.1 KR yards/attempt (No. 91), 25.2 KR yards allowed/attempt (No. 117)

Turnover Differential: -7

Time of Possession: 30:39 (No. 40)

Penalties: 74/49.8 YPG (No. 54)

A promising start turned sour quickly for Tulane, and ultimately led to Bob Toledo’s ouster. The Green Wave finished 2011 on a 10-game losing skid, following a 2-1 start. The streak started against Duke, but Tulane’s fifth game was the when the slide really started. Tulane went ahead 6-0 early at West Point, but Army responded with 45 consecutive points that became indicative of the remainder of the Green Wave’s campaign.

Despite losing offensive coordinator Dan Dodd in one of the more unusual circumstances prior to the season — Dodd opted to coach tiny Capistrano Valley Christian in Orange County, Calif. instead of the Green Wave — scoring points wasn’t the Green Wave’s problem. Running back Orleans Darkwa rushed for nearly 1000 yards and scored 13 touchdowns en route to 1st Team Louisiana honors. But Tulane struggled mightily to keep its opponents out of the end zone. Only twice did Tulane opponents score fewer than 30 points.

An interesting caveat of the Green Wave’s struggles is how low it ranked in special teams play. Against potent C-USA offenses, Tulane was surrendering short fields. That’s a recipe for disaster.

115. MEMPHIS

Record: 2-10, 1-7 Conference USA

Offense: 16.3 PPG (No. 115), 274.3 YPG (No. 116), 84 rushing YPG (No. 119), 190.3 passing YPG (No. 85), 86 percent red zone conversion (No. 35), 30.4 third down conversion (No. 113), 27 sacks allowed (No. 81)

Defense: 35.1 PPG allowed (No. 108), 491 YPG allowed (No. 117), 191.6 rushing YPG allowed (No. 97), 299.4 passing YPG allowed (No. 119), 79 percent opponent red zone conversion (No. 40), 46.4 opponent third down conversion (No. 100), 14 sacks (No. 108)

Special Teams: 11 PR/47 yards (No. 107), 95 punts/3993 yards (No. 89), 8-15 FGs, 21-25 PATs, 62 KR/1091 yards (No. 119), 7.26 PR yards/attempts allowed (No. 50), 22.1 KR yards/attempts allowed (No. 72)

Turnover Differential: +14

Time of Possession: 28:46 (No. 90)

Penalties: 57/43.58 YPG (No. 20)

Memphis very quietly became a very consistent program in the mid-2000s, reaching bowl games in five of six seasons. But when the streak of postseasons ended following the 2008 campaign, Memphis began a streak of a more dubious nature. The Tigers have languished at or very close to the bottom of the Bowl Subdivision each of the last three seasons.

The Tigers failed to capitalize on one of the best turnover differentials in the entire nation. That statistic compounds the many problems new Tiger head coach Justin Fuentes must address, as he begins the rebuilding process in 2012.

Record: 2-10, 1-7 Sun Belt

Offense: 22.3 PPG (No. 96), 401.1 YPG (No. 45), 146.8 rushing YPG (No. 69), 254.3 passing YPG (No. 37), 68 percent red zone conversion (No. 115), 40.1 third down conversion (No. 69), 8 sacks allowed (No. 2)

Defense: 36.8 PPG allowed (No. 110), 441.1 YPG allowed (No. 103), 229.5 rushing YPG allowed (No. 114), 211.6 passing YPG allowed (No. 44), 90 percent opponent red zone conversion (No. 111), 49 percent opponent third down conversion (No. 109), 17 sacks (No. 94)

Special Teams: 19 PR/204 yards (No. 32), 65 punts/2552 yards (No. 78), 8-14 FGs, 31-32 PATs, 63 KR/1216 yards (No. 107), 6.8 PR yards allowed/attempt (No. 45), 22.1 KR yards/attempt (No. 70)

Turnover Differential: -9

Time of Possession: 27:41 (No. 111)

Penalties: 92/68.2 YPG (No. 112)

No team finished on a more striking decline than MTSU. The Blue Raiders were arguably the nation’s worst team by season’s end, dropping their final six games by a combined 174 points — 29 per game, in other words. The 2011 season was a harsh downfall from reaching consecutive bowl games in 2009 and 2010.

Rick Stockstill’s ’11 Blue Raiders moved the ball rather effectively, the product of one of the best offensive lines in the country. The Blue Raider linemen gave up just eight sacks on the entire campaign. Yet in keeping with the theme of missed opportunities, failed to convert those into points. MTSU among the top third teams nationally passing the ball, thanks to Logan Kilgore’s emergence, and rushed decently. However, MTSU finished barely above the bottom third in points scored. With the MTSU defense surrendering points in droves, the offense’s anemia did the teams no favors.

MTSU was among the worst rushing defenses in the nation, which was the most fundamental flaw for the Blue Raiders. The defense’s struggles stopping the rush allowed opponents to dominate the ball. More negative for MTSU than the time lost were the points given up. Unlike the Blue Raider offense, opposing offenses were able to cash in opportunities to points.

Record: 1-11, 0-8 Big Ten

Offense: 21.4 PPG (No. 101), 360.4 YPG (No. 83), 161 rushing YPG (No. 53), 199.4 passing YPG (No. 80), 76 percent red zone conversion (No. 94), 40.8 third down conversion (No. 59)

Defense: 33.7 PPG allowed (No. 114), 458.7 YPG allowed (No. 109), 243.7 rushing YPG allowed (No. 118), 215 passing YPG allowed (No. 47), 88 percent opponent red zone efficiency (No. 100), 49.4 opponent third down conversion percentage (No. 111)

Special Teams: 8 PR/46 yards (No. 94), 71 punts/2723 yards (No. 84), 70 KR/1345 yards (No. 108), 13-16 FGM/FGA, 30-30 PATs, 6.6 PR yards/attempt allowed (No. 44), 23.2 KR yards/attempt allowed (No. 92)

Turnover Differential: +2

Time of Possession: 28:06 (No. 105)

Penalties: 83/64.7 YPG (No. 95)

Kevin Wilson left one of the most historically successful college football programs (Oklahoma) for one of the least. And after his first campaign as Indiana’s head coach, it’s difficult faulting anyone who questions Wilson’s decision to trade Norman for Bloomington. The Hoosiers joined Akron as the only program to go 0-for against the FBS and suffered such notable losses to Ball State and North Texas. Compounding IU’s futility was the surprise decommitment of prized quarterback recruit Gunner Kiel — though that he ever committed was its own suprise.

IU suffered five single digit defeats, four of which were in the first five games of the season. It was apparent that the team was in a transitional period, not only playing under a new head coach, but taking the field without quarterback Ben Chappell. The talented Chappell’s void was apparent, as the revolving door of Tre Roberson, Edward Wright-Baker and Dusty Kiel combined for 10 passing touchdowns and 11 interceptions. The latter two have since left the program.

Thus, Wilson constructed the offense around the rushing game. IU ball carriers combined to make for a decent attack, but it yielded little in the way of points. Meanwhile, opposing Big Ten offenses ran roughshod against an overwhelmed Hoosier defense.